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We analyze aspects of the structure of organizational culture. We show that old and culturally
uniform organizations are prone to cultural inertia, that is, they are reluctant to adopt a diﬀerent
culture in response to a change in the environment. Cultural uniformity can be beneﬁcial
because the associated inertia ex-post protects and therefore ex-ante encourages culture-speciﬁc
investments by agents. We also explore the model’s implications for such issues as cultural
uniformity within an organization, cultural heterogeneity across organizations, the destabilizing
eﬀect of growth and mergers, and the conﬂicts arising in the management of culture.
1 Introduction
Organizations develop speciﬁc cultures that can aﬀect their performance. Business successes and
failures have often been attributed to corporate cultures. Top management increasingly recognize
the importance of corporate culture and adopt active approaches to deﬁning cultural identity,
protecting it, and orchestrating cultural change. The notion extends beyond the corporate realm
to administrations, non-proﬁt organizations, etc. Despite its relevance, organizational culture
remains rather ill-deﬁned in economic theory. In fact, its resistance to a precise description is
one of its rare uncontroversial attributes.
This paper develops an economic model of organizational culture to address some questions
that we view as key to understand this concept (see Cr´ emer 1994). Why do similar organizations
develop diﬀerent cultures with diﬀerent long run economic performances? Why don’t organiza-
tions with inappropriate cultures always adopt new cultures better suited to their environment?
1We thank the editor, Keith Crocker, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
1Why are organizations reluctant to let multiple cultures coexist? And when they do, why does
this coexistence tend to generate conﬂicts?
Our model’s main premises are the following. First, agents in an organization are more pro-
ductive if they ﬁt in the culture in which they operate. Therefore, organizations strive to select
agents who are “good ﬁts”. This idea captures Schein (1986a)’s belief that “every organization
is concerned about the degree to which people at all levels ‘ﬁt’ into its structure.” Second, the
selection of agents is imperfect and takes place over time. Therefore, organizations accumulate
capital over time in the form of a stock of agents who are good ﬁts for the culture (or cultures)
in which they operate. In that respect, we adopt Prescott and Visscher (1980)’s view of the
organization as a storehouse of information or of organization capital, whose objective is to select
and allocate agents eﬃciently over time. Third, to ﬁt in, agents have to make investments that
are to some extent culture-speciﬁc. For example, they have to form new habits, acquire certain
social skills, etc. all of which have costs. Note that this notion of organization capital is related
to the concept of social capital developed by Bourdieu (1983) and Coleman (1988), and which
has become widely studied in the sociology literature. In words of the political scientist, Robert
Putnam: “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam (2000:19), see
also Cohen and Prusak (2001:4)). A major diﬀerence, however, is that social capital emphasizes
the direct externalities of cooperation whereas organization capital is concerned with matching
between the skills of the individuals and the environment in which they operate.
We begin by analyzing some of the determinants of cultural inertia. There is strong evidence
that some organizations have cultures that are maladapted to their environment, and that this
is reﬂected in their performance.2 The question arises as to why some organizations do not
adapt to changed environmental conditions, i.e., why some form of cultural inertia prevails.
Cultural inertia can arise naturally in our framework. Consider an organization whose agents
undertake a number of tasks. Tasks are best performed by following a coherent set of procedures,
informal rules of behavior, etc. which we generically call a culture. For concreteness, assume
that all agents in the organization operate in a culture that builds on adaptability or ﬂexibility,
and call it culture A. Some agents are better suited for this culture than others. For instance,
independent, unruly individuals who are more comfortable and productive if they can freely
organize their own schedule are “good ﬁts” for culture A. Over time, the organization screens
agents, keeping these good ﬁts, and thereby accumulating cultural-speciﬁc organization capital.
Suppose now that following a change in environmental conditions, A is no longer the most
2See Kotter and Heskett (1992) for a detailed analysis of the interaction between economic performance and
corporate culture in diﬀerent organizations.
2appropriate culture under which to perform a fraction of tasks. Instead, these tasks would be
best performed under a more bureaucratic or rigid culture, that we will call culture B. If the
organization does not adapt, these tasks continue being performed under culture A, and the
revenue they generate is reduced. If, instead, the organization decides to adapt, the tasks are
performed under culture B. This means that some of the agents whom the organization selected
for their ﬁt with culture A must now operate under culture B. Alternatively, these agents can
be ﬁred and replaced with new ones who are better ﬁts for culture B, for example bureaucratic
and dedicated 9-to-6 employees. In either case, the information accumulated about the existing
agents and their ﬁt with culture A is lost. The destruction of this organization capital constitutes
a cost of adapting.
This remark has three interesting implications. First, the cost of adapting to a new (orthog-
onal) culture increases with how well the agents ﬁt in the organization’s current culture. If the
level of organization capital is low, so is the opportunity cost of destroying some of that capital.
Since the “average ﬁt” between an organization’s agents and the culture in which they operate
improves over time, older organizations will be less prone to adapting to an environment change.
That is, cultural inertia increases with age (Proposition 1).3 Second, the cost of adapting stems
from the fact that the organization’s agents who have been screened to ﬁt in culture A are not
necessarily good ﬁts for culture B. Therefore, the cost of adapting would be lower if the orga-
nization had already selected some agents on the basis of their being good ﬁts for culture B. In
fact the cost of adapting to the change would be minimized if all the organization’s agents were
selected to ﬁt in culture B. By symmetry, however, this would maximize the cost of adapting to
environment changes in which some tasks are best performed under culture A. If, instead, the
organization had some fraction of agents selected under both culture A and B, it would be more
prone to adapt to changes of both types. In other words, culturally homogeneous organizations
are less likely to adapt than culturally diverse ones.4 That is, cultural inertia increases with
cultural uniformity (Proposition 2). Third, since homogeneity locks organizations in their cur-
rent culture, there is an interesting trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and gambling. On the one hand,
organizations may decide to remain ﬂexible enough to adapt to any environment change. This
is achieved by allocating agents to both cultures. On the other hand, organizations may bet on
whether the new environment will build on one of the existing cultures and screen all agents
to ﬁt in that culture. Which strategy is optimal depends on the cost of restructuring relative
to the value of organization capital (Proposition 3). Note that this allocation dilemma is due
3Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) study a related problem from an informational perspective. They show that
excess inertia in organizations where individuals have bounded memory (they recall past actions but not past
signals) is more likely to occur when the environment is stable and when the same action has been taken long
enough.
4Casual evidence suggests that a strong cost-cutting, ﬁnancially oriented strategy was a major cause of North-
west Airlines’ inability to adapt to a new competitive environment after deregulation in 1979. In contrast,
American Airlines’ more ﬂexible customer oriented strategy helped its adaptation (see Kotter and Heskett 1992).
3to an indirect externality eﬀect: the more agents are allocated to one culture, the higher the
organization capital lost if tasks are restructured. Understanding the determinants of cultural
inertia can also shed some light on the observed cultural heterogeneity across otherwise similar
organizations. Older organizations may be locked in a culture at the time of an environment
change, while younger organizations will adapt. Organizations of similar age might also have
begun with what were at the time diﬀerent but equally attractive (uniform) cultures and have
become locked in.
We then argue that an organization’s cultural structure can mitigate or exacerbate incentive
problems. We show that in organizations in which multiple cultures coexist, agents have weaker
incentives to undertake culture-speciﬁc investments. Conversely, cultural uniformity is more
conducive to such investments. Therefore, the gains associated with cultural diversity must
be weighted not only against the costs of restructuring, but also against the cost of reduced
incentives.
In our set-up, the costs and beneﬁts of cultural uniformity are two sides of the same coin.
On the one hand, cultural uniformity increases the expected cost of adapting to an environ-
ment change. Hence, cultural diversity can be beneﬁcial in that it gives the organization a
greater ability to adapt to new contexts. On the other hand, the cultural inertia associated
with cultural uniformity ex-post protects and thus ex-ante encourages agents’ culture-speciﬁc
investments. Therefore, cultural uniformity can also be desirable (Propositions 4 and 5).5 This
second consideration is important when incentives schemes based explicitly on investment are
not possible or excessively costly, and when the organization has no other way to commit not
to adapt to an environmental change (e.g. through an explicit contract).
This point has several applications. First, an active management of organizational culture
is key to controlling the tensions between the organization’s performance and the welfare and
incentives of its agents. These very tensions can generate conﬂicts. For instance, the organization
and its agents may disagree about the optimal degree to which new agents should be screened.
Indeed, more intense screening accelerates the process of inertia as the “average ﬁt” between
the agents and the culture in which they operate increases faster (i.e., organization capital is
accumulated faster), implying a higher opportunity cost of adapting. Hence, if sorting is costly,
it is possible that agents will favor more intense screening than the organization would be willing
to pay for. Similar conﬂicts can also arise over the organization’s hiring policy between agents of
diﬀerent age within the organization and also between agents working under diﬀerent cultures.
A second application regards the eﬀect of growth. The gains from cultural uniformity and
5Boyer and Robert (2006) analyze a related trade-oﬀ in a principal-agent context with explicit contracts. They
characterize the optimal contract when the agent’s ex ante incentives to put eﬀort in a project are aﬀected by the
principal’s ex post ﬂexibility to abandon the project if a more attractive one appears.
4accumulation of organization capital are endangered in fast growing organizations. The sub-
stantial inﬂux of new hires dilutes the agents’ cultural ﬁt and so reduces the organization’s
opportunity cost of adapting. We argue that this consideration can constrain the organization’s
growth. Similarly, the stability ensured by cultural uniformity may be put at risk in mergers of
culturally diﬀerent organizations.
Formal models of corporate culture have stressed the beneﬁts of a strong cultural identity.
For instance, it can accelerate the organization’s reputation building (Kreps 1990) or encourage
horizontal communication (Cr´ emer 1993). Other recent works have focused on the importance
of cultural uniformity. We depart from these mainly in two respects. First, in the informal
literature (Kotter and Heskett 1992), rigid cultures are always suboptimal in uncertain environ-
ments but can nonetheless prevail due to the inability of managers to impose more ﬂexible ones.
Also, some cultures may prove inferior to others and yet be maintained because superior cultures
are inimitable (Barney 1986; Besanko et al. 2000). Instead of assuming the impossibility of a
cultural change, cultural inertia arises in our paper as the endogenously optimal response to
incentive problems within the organization. Second, most formal theories (Lazear 1999); Rob
and Zemsky 2002) posit a direct positive externality between agents with similar cultures.6 In
contrast, we assume away such direct externalities to better point out an indirect one: the more
agents ﬁt in a given culture, the higher the opportunity cost for the organization to undertake
changes such that this organization capital is lost.7 Finally, our paper is related to the literature
on incentives and corporate structure. In this context, Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) make the
related point that a narrow business strategy enables ﬁrms to motivate employees to search for
ways of increasing productivity in its core activities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of organizational culture and
derives some of its basic properties, including the eﬀect of time on the organization’s incentives
to adapt to changed environmental conditions. Section 3 studies how the cultural structure of
an organization (heterogenous or homogenous) also aﬀects cultural inertia. Section 4 shows how
cultural uniformity can mitigate the agents’ incentive problems. Section 5 develops implications
of the theory for conﬂicts over the management of culture(s) and for the impact of growth and
mergers on the cultural stability of an organization. It also suggests possible extensions. Section
6 concludes. Our central conclusions are gathered in Propositions 1 to 5. Some other interesting
insights can be found in Results 1 to 7. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
6For instance, agents might interact better or reciprocate more if they share the same culture. However, it
is unlikely that all agents in large organizations interact with each other directly or even through third parties.
Why should loosely connected parts of an organization have similar cultures?
7We do not mean that direct interactions are irrelevant: the literature on social capital widely documents the
existence of complementarities between individuals. However, this restriction allows to stress the idea that, even
in a context where cultural diversity is a superior organizational structure, the agents’ incentive problem may
induce the organization to adopt a uniform culture.
52 A Model of Organizational Culture
In this section, we develop a model of organizations and organizational culture (section 2.1).
We begin by introducing two of the three main features of our model. First, an organization’s
agents are more productive if they ﬁt in the culture in which they operate. Second, organizations
select agents who are good ﬁts but do so imperfectly and over time.8 This setup captures the
idea that organization capital accumulates over time (section 2.2), and therefore that time is a
determinant of cultural inertia (section 2.3).
2.1 The Basic Model
We consider an organization with the following characteristics.
Tasks. The organization performs a continuum of tasks (with measure 1) in each of an
inﬁnite number of periods t = 0,1,2,... Each task requires exactly one agent.
Payoﬀs. Agents receive a ﬁxed wage w in each period of employment by the organization.
The outside wage is normalized to 0. The total payoﬀs for the organization and the agents is
the sum of all their per-period payoﬀs discounted at the same rate δ.
Culture(s). A given task is best performed by following a coherent set of procedures, informal
rules of behavior, etc. which we generically call a “culture”. We assume that there are only two
possible cultures in the economy, A and B. For concreteness, one can think of culture A as
building on “adaptability” while culture B being more “bureaucratic”.
Cultural ﬁt. Some agents are “good ﬁts” for a culture, while others are “misﬁts”. For
instance, good ﬁts for a culture based on adaptability may be independent and unruly individuals
productive if they can organize their schedule. Conversely, bureaucratic, dedicated 9-to-6 types,
productive when their mission is well speciﬁed will be better ﬁts for a bureaucratic culture.
Labor market. There is a labor market in which a fraction s of agents are good ﬁts for culture
A and a fraction s of agents are good ﬁts for culture B. The overlap between these two sets,
i.e. the agents who are good ﬁts for both cultures, represents a fraction sµ of all agents in the
labor market, where µ ∈ (0,1). The parameter µ then measures the “closeness” of cultures A
and B. Last, the remaining (positive) fraction of agents are misﬁts for both cultures.9 For the
time being, we assume that s is ﬁxed: agents cannot aﬀect their likelihood of being good ﬁts.
This parameter will be endogenized in section 4, where we consider culture-speciﬁc investments.
8For now, we leave out the third main feature of our model, namely that to ﬁt in, agents have to make costly
investments that are to some extent culture-speciﬁc. This feature is introduced in section 4.
9Summing up, a fraction s(1 − µ) are good ﬁts only for culture A, a fraction s(1 − µ) are good ﬁts only for
culture B, a fraction sµ are good ﬁts for both A and B and a fraction 1 − 2s + sµ are misﬁts for both A and B.
6Revenues. Agents working in the organization are more productive if they ﬁt in the culture in
which they operate. Formally, in each period, a task generates a revenue RL to the organization
if performed by a misﬁt and RH ≡ RL +∆ if performed by a good ﬁt. A task is best performed
by a good ﬁt (i.e. ∆ > 0), but is proﬁtable even if performed by a misﬁt (i.e. RL > w).
Screening and turnover. The organization screens agents on the basis of whether they are
“good ﬁts” for the culture in which they operate. In period t = 0, a continuum of agents
(with measure 1) are hired from the labor market. At the end of each period, each agent quits
the organization with probability (1 − λ). For simplicity, λ is assumed to be exogenous and
independent of the agent’s identity and history. Among the remaining agents, each misﬁt is
detected with probability p, and automatically ﬁred. All departing agents (those who quit and
those who are ﬁred) are replaced with new agents from the labor market. Therefore, in each
period, the organization employs a continuum of agents with measure 1.10
Contracts. Only short-term contracts are feasible. In particular, the organization cannot
commit on severance payments or employment. Also, the number of periods an agent has spent
in the organization is not observable. This allows us to avoid the issue of discriminatory ﬁring.
2.2 The Organization as Sieve
For now and for simplicity, assume the existence of a unique culture, say culture A. In our
model, the organization screens its agents so as to increase their ﬁt with its culture. We denote
by st the organization’s cultural ﬁt in period t, deﬁned as the fraction of its agents who are
good ﬁts for its culture. The population of agents in the organization evolves over time, due to
screening and exogenous departures. Consider the organization at t = 0. As all of its agents
have just been hired from the labor market, the fraction of good ﬁts is s0 = s.11 At the end of
period t = 0, a fraction (1 − λ) of agents voluntarily quit the organization. Therefore, a mass
λs of good ﬁts and a mass λ(1−s) of misﬁts remain. Finally, among the remaining mass λ(1−s)
of misﬁts, a fraction p of them are screened out. Hence, the total mass of agents leaving the
organization voluntarily or through ﬁring is (1 − λ) + λ(1 − s)p. These agents are replaced by
new hires, a fraction s of whom are good ﬁts. The organization’s cultural ﬁt in period t = 1 is
then:
s1 = λs +
h
(1 − λ) + λ(1 − s)p
i
· s > s0
10We rule out the possibility that the organization hires more agents than needed and screens unskilled agents
so as to reduce the cost of replacing active ones. This option is never optimal in our model if screening occurs on
the job, i.e. if it is impossible or excessively costly to evaluate idle agents. Note also that, given no replacement
cost, it is always optimal to ﬁre a detected misﬁt. For models in which the organization ﬁrst evaluates agents in
screening tasks and then allocates them to productive jobs, see Prescott and Visscher (1980) and Carrillo (2003).
11Of these agents, s(1 − µ) are misﬁts for culture B and sµ are good ﬁts also for culture B although, at this
stage, their ﬁt with culture B is irrelevant.
7More generally, the relationship between the organization’s cultural ﬁt in periods t and t−1, st
and st−1, is:
st = λst−1 +
h
(1 − λ) + λ(1 − st−1)p
i
· s = λ(1 − ps)st−1 + (1 − λ + λp)s
Solving for the generic term of the series, we get:
st =

1 − λ + λp
1 − λ + λps
− λt(1 − ps)t λp(1 − s)
1 − λ + λps

· s (1)
Note that the organization’s cultural ﬁt increases over time (st+1 > st). Besides, due to exoge-
nous quits (λ < 1), there is always a fraction of misﬁts in the organization even in the long run
(s∞ =
1−λ+λp
1−λ+λps · s < 1). Last, in the absence of screening (p = 0) or if every agent exogenously
quit the organization after one period (λ = 0), the fraction of good ﬁts would remain constant
over time (st = s for all t).
In period t, the organization receives the ﬁxed revenue RL from all of its agents and pays
them a wage w. Also, good ﬁts (in proportion st) generate an additional revenue ∆. Hence, the








Note that screening acts as a sieve and increases the proportion of good ﬁts over time. Therefore,
the organization’s continuation value also increases over time. For instance, given (1) and (2),
the increase in continuation value between period 0 and period t is:
Vt − V0 = ∆ ·
∞ X
τ=0
δτ(st+τ − sτ) =
(st − s0)∆
1 − δλ(1 − ps)
> 0 (3)
which is also the deadweight loss incurred if the organization is dissolved in period t and restarted
from scratch. In other words, the organization accumulates capital over time in the form of a
stock of agents who are good ﬁts for the culture under which they operate. If the organization
is terminated, its organization capital is lost. The result is summarized as follows.
Result 1 (Organization capital) As the organization ages, its cultural ﬁt increases (st+1 > st
for all t) and so does its continuation value (Vt+1 > Vt for all t).
2.3 Time and Inertia
As Wilson (1989:91) nicely points: “Culture is to an organization what personality is to an
individual. Like human culture generally, it is passed on from one generation to the next. It
changes slowly, if at all.” Numerous case studies document instances of cultural inertia, that is,
8cases in which an organization fails to adapt its culture to a new environment.12 Phenomena of
cultural inertia arise naturally in our framework when we consider a changing environment.
Environment change. In a given period T, an environment change occurs, and the organi-
zation can decide whether to adapt. One can think of the environment change as the discovery
of a new technology or a new production method. If the organization does not adapt (that
is, if it does not acquire this technology or production method), it loses its competitive edge:
given this foregone opportunity, the revenue generated from period T onwards in a fraction
γ of the non-restructured tasks decreases by an amount ∆0 (with ∆0 > ∆). That is, each of
the γ tasks generates RL − ∆0 or RH − ∆0 if performed by a misﬁt or a good ﬁt for culture
A respectively.13 For simplicity, we assume that T is known, that there is no further environ-
ment change afterwards, and that all tasks are valuable even if the organization does not adapt
(RL − ∆0 > w).
Restructuring. Alternatively, the organization can adapt to the new environment and re-
structure the γ tasks, which involves a ﬁxed cost K.14 At the time of the decision on whether
to adapt, the extent of the environment change (measured by γ) is not known. Instead, γ is
distributed over [0,1] according to a known distribution F(·).
Cultural compatibility. If the organization decides to adapt, the γ tasks are best performed
by agents who are good ﬁts for culture C. We distinguish between two cases: a culturally
compatible restructuring, that is, one which builds on the existing culture (we denote it C = A0),
and a culturally incompatible restructuring, that is, one which builds on the opposite culture
(we denote it C = B0).15
Consider ﬁrst the culturally compatible case (C = A0). It corresponds to a restructuring
where independent, creative individuals (good ﬁts for culture A) are suitable for the new tasks
or production method. For example, this occurs if new missions are not well deﬁned and the
new tasks need the input and imagination of its agents. It is optimal for the organization to
adopt this new production method if and only if the expected increase in the value of payoﬀs




· E [γ] − K > 0 (4)
12For example, after several years of good performance, Xerox and Northwest Airlines failed to adapt their
culture to a contextual change of increased competition due, respectively, to the emergence of new Japanese
organizations and the deregulation of the airline industry. In contrast, young Japanese ﬁrms adapted successfully
(see Kotter and Heskett 1992).
13Identical results are obtained if revenues do not change under no restructuring and revenues increase by ∆
0
in a fraction γ of tasks under restructuring.
14Given a ﬁxed cost to adapt, it is optimal to restructure either none or all the γ tasks.
15It is not crucial for our analysis that culture C builds entirely on either culture A or culture B. It is only
necessary that it be “closer” to one than to the other.
9In the remainder of the paper we assume that this condition holds, that is, a culturally compatible
restructuring is always proﬁtable.
The culturally incompatible restructuring case (C = B0) is slightly more complex. It corre-
sponds to a new production method with well deﬁned tasks and rigid schedules, for which agents
who are good ﬁts for B are suitable but agents who are good ﬁts only for A are not. Suppose
that the organization decides to adapt to the change. Given ∆0 > ∆, it is more proﬁtable to
assign the γ restructured tasks to culture B0 immediately (i.e., at date T) rather than to keep
agents working under culture A and restructure the corresponding tasks only as these agents
depart. However, the organization still has to decide whether to ﬁre γ agents and replace them
with agents from the labor market (the “radical” strategy) or to set γ existing agents currently
screened for their ﬁt to culture A to work under culture B0 (the “gradual” strategy).
Compared to the case C = A0, the radical strategy when C = B0 involves the additional cost
of replacing an expected mass E[γ] of agents screened under culture A with unscreened agents,
who will perform under culture B0. Losing the screened agents has a cost proportional to sT.
However, not all the replacements will be misﬁts; a proportion s of them will be good ﬁts for




1 − δλ(1 − ps)
· E[γ] (5)
The gradual strategy when C = B0 also involves a cost compared to C = A0. Reallocating
the agents screened under A has a cost proportional to sT. However, since µ > 0, some of these
agents will still be good ﬁts for culture B0. Formally, the fraction of good ﬁts for culture B0 at
date T and given that these agents have been screened for their ﬁt to culture A is:16
˜ sT ≡ sT · µ + (1 − sT) ·
s(1 − µ)
1 − s
Therefore, using again (3) and (4), the net value of restructuring with the gradual strategy is:
Γ −
(sT − ˜ sT)∆
1 − δλ(1 − ps)
· E [γ]







1 − δλ(1 − ps)
· E [γ] (6)
By inspection of (5) and (6), we reach our second result.




s = µ and Pr(B| ¯ A) =
Pr(B∩ ¯ A)
Pr( ¯ A) =
s−sµ
1−s .
10Result 2 (Cultural incompatibility and inertia) A culturally incompatible restructuring is
more likely to be adopted with a gradual rather than a radical strategy if cultures are close to
each other (greater µ) and there are few good ﬁts in the labor market (smaller s).
The closeness of cultures and the availability of good ﬁts in the labor market determine the
relative value of the two restructuring strategies. More precisely, from (5) and (6) we notice
that the gradual strategy outperforms the radical one if and only if s < µ. Nevertheless, since
both strategies involve the opportunity cost of a loss in organization capital, the best of them






1 − δλ(1 − ps)
(7)
Therefore, the organization decides to adapt to the environment change if and only if:
Γ − GT · E [γ] > 0 (8)
This expression captures the organization’s trade-oﬀ when considering a culturally incompatible
restructuring. On the one hand, the organization must consider the beneﬁt of adapting to the
new environment, which leads to higher revenues in the future. On the other hand, a culturally
incompatible restructuring involves the cost of giving up part of the gains of past screening, i.e.
it implies the loss of some of the accumulated organization capital.
Proposition 1 (Determinants of inertia: Time)
Organizations that are older at the time of the environment change (greater T) and with more
short-term interest (smaller δ) are less prone to adapt to culturally incompatible restructuring.
Proof. See Appendix A1. 2
The population of agents in old organizations has been screened for a long period of time.
As a result, they are on average highly suited to the existing culture. Therefore, the opportunity
cost of losing the beneﬁt of past screening increases over time. This leads to inertia increasing
with age.17 Similarly, when the organization puts more weight on future revenues, the beneﬁts
of a culturally incompatible restructuring increase relative to its cost. Consequently, such a
restructuring is more likely.
3 The Structure of Organizational Culture
In this section, we study the possible coexistence of multiple cultures within the same organiza-
tion. We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects of an organization’s cultural structure (i.e., the mix of cultures
17A similar inertia is analyzed in the literature on technological leapfrogging (see Brezis et al. 1993).
11within the organization) on its adaptation to environment changes (section 3.1), and then derive
implications for the optimal choice of cultural structure (section 3.2). To analyze these issues,
we assume that the organization may decide to allocate diﬀerent tasks to diﬀerent cultures and
to screen agents accordingly.
Multiple cultures. In period 0, the organization allocates a fraction α of tasks to culture A
and a fraction 1 − α to culture B. It is immediately noticed that, since µ < 1, the organization
will optimally keep constant the fraction of tasks under each culture. That is, each agent hired
from the labor market is set to work under the same culture as the agent he replaces.
3.1 Uniformity and Inertia
Suppose that C = B0. Building on section 2.3, we know that restructuring has beneﬁts and costs.
First, an expected mass E[γ] of tasks generate a per-period revenue increased by ∆0. Moreover,
if γ < 1 − α, the only cost to pay for this restructuring is K, since the agents allocated to the
restructured tasks are already screened under the compatible culture B. However, if γ > 1−α,
then a mass γ − (1 − α) of tasks previously performed under culture A will now be performed
under culture B0. As shown before, the culturally incompatible restructuring of these agents
(whether gradual or radical) has an opportunity cost GT. Overall, the value of restructuring is:




γ − (1 − α)

dF(γ) (9)
Note that ΠT(0) = Γ and ΠT(1) = Γ − GT · E[γ]. These correspond to expressions (4) and
(8) respectively, that is, to a fully compatible and a fully incompatible restructuring. In other
words, (9) generalizes the opportunity cost of a restructuring to organizations with an initial
cultural mix (α ∈ (0,1)). Note also that, given the symmetry of cultures A and B, the value of
restructuring when C = A0 is simply ΠT(1−α). Cultural inertia is thus aﬀected by the cultural
structure of the organization.
Proposition 2 (Determinants of inertia: Uniformity)
Organizations are less prone to undertake a restructuring that is culturally incompatible for many
of their tasks (B0 if α is high and A0 if α is low).
Proof. See Appendix A2. 2
When more agents work under A, the beneﬁt Γ from restructuring is unchanged, but the
opportunity cost if C = B0 is higher (∂ΠT(α)/∂α < 0). Indeed, as fewer of the organization’s
agents already ﬁt in culture B when restructuring occurs with C = B0, more tasks will have to
be switched from culture A to culture B0, resulting in a larger loss in organization capital.
The analysis so far has implications for the source of cultural diversity across organizations.
First, older organizations may be more reluctant to adapt. That is, organizations of diﬀerent
12age, but otherwise similar, may react diﬀerently to a change in their environment (Proposition
1). Another channel is that ﬁrms of similar age started oﬀ with and became locked in diﬀerent
but equally attractive cultures whose performance later diverged. Diﬀerent organizations may
operate under diﬀerent cultural structures due, for instance, to diﬀerent access to labor or
diﬀerent priors about the environment. The more culturally homogeneous ones may have become
locked in (Proposition 2). In other words, cultural heterogeneity across organizations may be a
consequence of cultural uniformity within organizations.
3.2 Multiple Cultures: Flexibility vs. Gambling
So far, we have taken the organization’s cultural structure as given. In practice, ﬁrms select
diﬀerent strategies with a diﬀerent mix of cultures. For example, the policy of Coors in the
80’s was homogeneous and conservative; all agents were screened on the basis of their skills for
improving quality, but never to follow an aggressive and risky research strategy. By contrast,
Nissan developed a more ﬂexible business policy: some employees were engaged in new, highly
risky projects while others continued the production of high quality but standard cars (see
Kotter and Heskett 1992).
These choices are very much related to the anticipation of the organization’s environment.
To analyze this idea and its implications for cultural structure, we assume that until period T,
the organization is uncertain about whether C = A0 or C = B0. For simplicity, assume that
both outcomes are equally likely, and let α∗ denote the mass of agents working under culture A
that maximizes the organization’s expected payoﬀ. We can determine its optimal cultural mix.
Proposition 3 (Flexibility vs. gambling in the choice of culture).
(i) If ΠT(1
2) < 1
2 ΠT(0), a uniform culture is optimal (α∗ ∈ {0,1}) and only a culturally
compatible restructuring is undertaken (only when C = A0 if α∗ = 1 and only when C = B0 if
α∗ = 0);
(ii) Otherwise, it is optimal to maintain an equal number of tasks under both cultures (α∗ =
1/2) and adapt irrespective of the type of restructuring (both when C = A0 and C = B0).
Proof. See Appendix A3. 2
If the organization plans to restructure only if C = A0, then it should put all its eggs in
one basket and set α∗ = 1. This is because the more tasks are under culture A, the lower the
expected opportunity cost of restructuring when C = A0 (formally, ∂ΠT(1−α)/∂α > 0). Under
such a strategy, the organization’s expected payoﬀ of a restructuring weighted by the likelihood
of a restructuring is 1
2 ΠT(0).
Note however that the gains of having one more task under culture A when C = A0 is
decreasing in the existing fraction of tasks under that culture (formally, ∂2ΠT(1−α)/∂α2 < 0).
13Indeed, given that only a fraction γ of tasks need to be restructured, if the mass of tasks under
culture A is suﬃciently large, then it is already unlikely that the organization will need to switch
any task from B to A0 after restructuring. As a result, the marginal value of having yet another
task under A decreases with α. Due to these decreasing returns to scale, conditional on a
restructuring occurring irrespective of whether C = A0 or C = B0, it is optimal to set α∗ = 1/2.
The organization’s expected payoﬀ of a restructuring if it always adapts is then ΠT(1
2).
Proposition 3 highlights a fundamental trade-oﬀ between “ﬂexibility” and “gambling”: or-
ganizations must decide either to remain adaptable enough to restructure both when C = A0
and when C = B0, or bet on whether C = A0 or C = B0 and allocate all tasks to the same
culture. This allocation dilemma is due to an indirect externality: the more agents are allocated
to one culture, the higher the organization capital lost if tasks are restructured. Which strategy








Note that ﬂexibility is attractive when all restructuring are relatively valuable (Γ high), either
because the ﬁxed cost K of adaptation to a new culture is low or because the productivity
loss ∆0 under no restructuring is high. Conversely, gambling is desirable when the opportunity
cost of replacing screened agents after a culturally incompatible restructuring is signiﬁcant (GT
high). This cost may be high because the organization is old and agents have been screened for
many periods (T high), because agents who have already been screened are very valuable (∆
high), or because it is diﬃcult to screen agents (p low).
4 Cultural Structure and Incentives
We have shown that inertia increases with the organization’s age and uniformity (Propositions
1 and 2), and we have built a case for the optimality of cultural diversity (Proposition 3(ii)).
We now use it as a benchmark to present the next argument of the paper, which is that an
organization’s cultural structure can mitigate or exacerbate internal incentive problems. We
introduce the third main feature of our model, namely that to “ﬁt in”, agents have to make
investments that are, to some extent, culture-speciﬁc.
Culture-speciﬁc investment. Suppose now that all agents in the labor market are initially
misﬁts, but can incur a non-observable cost c to become good ﬁts for culture A with probability
s. Alternatively, they can incur c to become good ﬁts for culture B with probability s. We
can think of this cost as being that of having to form new habits, of acquiring certain social
skills, etc. Note that the investment is not entirely culture-speciﬁc: by investing in becoming a
good ﬁt for culture A with probability s, the agent also becomes a good ﬁt for culture B with
14probability sµ. However, the investment is partly culture-speciﬁc: its return is lower if the agent
operates in culture B than if he operates in culture A (i.e., µ < 1).
To clarify the discussion, we focus on the case in which our main points arise most naturally.
Assumption 1 ΠT(1) < 0 and ΠT(1
2) > 1
2 ΠT(0).
The ﬁrst part of the assumption means that if all agents work under the same culture, then
a culturally incompatible restructuring is not proﬁtable. The second part of the assumption
together with Proposition 3 implies that, if c = 0, then it is optimal for the organization
to maintain both cultures (α∗ = 1/2), and to restructure irrespective of whether C = A0 or
C = B0.18
Because the investment is not observable, it is not possible to sign contracts requiring explic-
itly the agents to undertake it.19 Therefore, one needs to study the agents’ implicit incentives
to make the investment. Of course, given Assumption 1 the problem does not arise when c = 0,
which corresponds to the case analyzed in previous sections. Assume now a strictly positive
investment cost c, and consider an agent set to work under culture A. Suppose ﬁrst that the
organization does not restructure if C = B0. The agent’s expected payoﬀs if he is a good ﬁt for
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In what follows, we assume that agents ﬁnd it optimal to incur the cost of becoming a good ﬁt
if this investment is not jeopardized by possible task restructuring.
Assumption 2 0 < c < W1.
Suppose now that the organization adapts to any environment change. The probability that
an agent working under culture A is “aﬀected” by the restructuring when C = B0 (i.e., ﬁred or













2 ΠT(0) are compatible by concavity of ΠT. (Note that concavity
of ΠT is a result of the model not an assumption).
19It would be enough that the investment be non-veriﬁable. Non-observability of the investment also prevents
selective ﬁrings and hirings.
15where the numerator represents the expected fraction of agents aﬀected by the restructuring,
and the denominator is the total fraction of agents working under culture A. If restructuring
at date T occurs whether C = A0 or C = B0 and the restructured tasks are ﬁlled with agents
from the labor market (the radical strategy), the expected increase in the agent’s wage from his
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The ﬁrst term in the expression is the probability that the agent will not be aﬀected by the
restructuring, multiplied by W1, the gain of investing under this condition. The second term
is the likelihood of being aﬀected, multiplied by the short-term gain of being skilled (i.e., wage
times the increase in discounted expected length of employment until the new culture is adopted
at T and the agent replaced).
If the organization adapts to the environment change with the gradual strategy, the expected
increase in the agent’s payoﬀ from investing in becoming a good ﬁt is:
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The only diﬀerence compared to the radical strategy is that a good ﬁt for culture A who is
reallocated to B0 remains also a good ﬁt for culture B0 with probability µ. Using (10), (11)
and (12) and rearranging terms, we can ﬁnally determine W2(α,T), the increase in payoﬀ from
investing in becoming a good ﬁt for culture A when the organization adapts to the environment
change if C = B0:
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where 1 Iµ>s = 1 if µ > s (the gradual strategy is adopted) and 1 Iµ>s = 0 if µ < s (the radical
strategy is adopted). Note that ∂W2(α,T)/∂T > 0 and W2(α,∞) = W1 , so that W2(α,T) < W1
for all T.20 In words, the possibility of a culturally incompatible task restructuring decreases
the value for agents of investing in becoming a good ﬁt. But, as we show below, the incentives
of agents to undertake culture-speciﬁc investments depend, in turn, on the cultural structure of
the organization.
Proposition 4 (Cultural structure and incentives) As α increases, the cost for an agent
under A of a culturally incompatible restructuring increases (z0(α) > 0), and so does his will-
ingness to undertake an investment speciﬁc to culture A.
20By symmetry, for agents working under culture B, the probability of being aﬀected by a restructuring when
C = A
0 is z(1 − α) and the payoﬀ increase from investing in becoming a good ﬁt for B is W2(1 − α,T).
16The analysis above has some important implications. Suppose for the time being that the
cultural structure is ﬁxed and exogenously given (Proposition 5 deals precisely with the en-
dogeneity of cultural choice). In organizations in which multiple cultures coexist, agents have
weaker incentives to undertake culture-speciﬁc investments. Conversely, cultural uniformity is
more conducive to such investments. Therefore, it predicts that incentive problems are more
likely to manifest themselves in culturally diverse organizations. This also implies that it will be
particularly important for culturally diverse organizations to spend eﬀort and resources dealing
with incentive problems.21 They should provide incentives to their agents through incentive
schemes (e.g., based explicitly on investment), intense screening of new and existing agents, and
to reduce the investment cost for their agents, e.g. through training programs or subsidies.
Interestingly, however, culturally diverse organizations may ﬁnd themselves in a bind. Other
things equal, the increased motivation of one group of agents decreases that of other groups.
The investment of agents operating in culture B reduces the organization’s cost of adapting to
a change when C = B0, and therefore makes such a restructuring more likely. This, in turn,
reduces the incentives of agents operating under culture A (see also section 5.1.2). The result
also suggests that culturally diverse organizations will try to ﬁnd ways to commit themselves
to refrain from adapting to an environmental change. Such commitment may take the form of
explicit contracts or more generally of other actions that increase the cost of adapting.
Naturally, the cultural structure is itself a choice variable. Proposition 4 has then implications
for the optimal cultural mix within the organization. It implies that the gains associated with
cultural diversity must be weighted against the costs of reduced incentives. In our set-up, the
costs and beneﬁts of cultural uniformity are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand,
cultural uniformity increases the expected cost of adapting to an environment change. Hence, if
adapting is likely to be necessary, cultural diversity can be preferable. In other words, cultural
diversity can be beneﬁcial in that it can give the organization a greater ability to adapt to new
contexts. On the other hand, however, cultural uniformity can also be beneﬁcial: the cultural
inertia associated with cultural uniformity protects and thus encourages agents’ culture-speciﬁc
investments. As we argued above, this is particularly important when the organization has no
other (or no cheaper) way to commit not to adapt to an environmental change. Therefore, as
incentive problems increase, so does the attractiveness of cultural uniformity for the organization.
In fact, we show that cultural uniformity within organizations can arise as an optimal response
to incentive problems.
Proposition 5 (Uniformity as Commitment). There exists a threshold c∗ ∈ (0,W1) such
21Rob and Zemsky (2002) study the relation between incentives and culture from a diﬀerent angle. In their
paper, the organization sets an incentive mechanism that promotes the optimal level of cooperation and therefore
the optimal accumulation of social capital.
17that if c ≥ c∗, a uniform culture is optimal (α∗ ∈ {0,1}) and only a culturally compatible
restructuring is undertaken (only when C = A0 if α∗ = 1 and only when C = B0 if α∗ = 0).
Proof. See Appendix A4. 2
Recall that, under Assumption 1, diversity is optimal in the absence of incentive prob-
lems (i.e., for c = 0). Consider now the case of severe incentive problems. For example, if
c > W2(α,T), no agent will invest at any date to become a good ﬁt for culture A unless the
organization commits not to restructure if C = B0. Because explicit commitments are not feasi-
ble, the organization must set α large enough so that, when the time of the environment change
arrives, it is not ex-post proﬁtable to restructure if C = B0. Given that only culturally compat-
ible restructuring are undertaken, the organization optimally sets maximum cultural uniformity
i.e., all agents working under A (α = 1). In other words, the inertia associated with suﬃcient
cultural uniformity ex-post locks the organization and thus encourages ex-ante culture-speciﬁc
investments by its agents.
Note that time also contributes to the commitment against opportunistic behavior. Recall
that the organization’s proportion of good ﬁts increases over time (Proposition 1). Therefore, in
case of uncertainty over T, cultural uniformity also serves as a commitment against culturally
incompatible restructuring. In this case, the commitment will be imperfect; despite cultural uni-
formity, the organization may adapt to changes if they occur early enough in the organization’s
life. Nevertheless, cultural uniformity minimizes the probability of such an event.
5 Applications
Our theory argues that cultural uniformity can be an optimal response to incentive problems
within an organization. More generally, uniformity will be conducive to culture-speciﬁc invest-
ments by their agents. The result has several implications, some of which are explored below.22
5.1 Internal Conﬂicts over the Management of Culture
Culture is often at the center of conﬂicts internal to organizations. In our model, an active man-
agement of organizational culture is key to controlling the tensions between the organization’s
performance and the welfare and incentives of its agents. We illustrate the nature of potential
conﬂicts with two examples: the choice of screening intensity and the hiring policy.
22This section is more informal than the core of the paper. It can be skipped by the reader interested only in
a formal, analytical approach to the problem.
185.1.1 Organization vs. Agents
The organization and its agents can disagree over the intensity of screening. Screening accel-
erates the accumulation of organization capital which, if managed properly, can never hurt the
organization. Therefore, as long as it is free, screening is always beneﬁcial for organizations.
The agents’ viewpoint is diﬀerent. Intense screening forces them to incur the cost of becoming
a good ﬁt. Moreover, screening increases the likelihood of early ﬁring of misﬁts, irrespective of
whether they did not invest or their investment failed. Therefore, it may seem that the agents
would favor an intensity of screening as low as possible. This presumption need not be true.
Result 3 (Conﬂict, 1) The optimal intensity of screening from the agents’ viewpoint is strictly
positive if c and T are small enough. If screening involves a cost (partly) borne by the organiza-
tion, then agents may prefer more screening than optimal from the organization’s viewpoint.
Proof. See Appendix A5. 2
From the agents’ viewpoint, screening has costs but also beneﬁts. Intense screening increases
the likelihood of being ﬁred for being a misﬁt. However, it also improves the organization’s
cultural ﬁt and thus increases inertia.23 When the cultural change is imminent (T small), agents
are better-oﬀ accelerating the lock-in process. Conversely, when becoming a good ﬁt is costly (c
large), the beneﬁts of a quite life under slack screening dominate. Hence, the implication that
agents may prefer more screening than the organization when the latter pays for it.
The organization’s hiring policy can give rise to similar conﬂicts. Since uniformity protects
their investment, agents may put pressure to set a hiring policy that results in greater cultural
uniformity than optimal from the organization’s viewpoint. Moreover, agents in place will also
favor a more intense screening than optimal from the organization’s viewpoint. Note that despite
these conﬂicts, the organization may have also good reasons to delegate some control of the hiring
policy if the agents’ expertise is needed. For instance, recruiting can rely on agents identifying
potential good hires so that, even if agents have no formal say in the hiring decision, they can
recommend candidates. Also, the productivity of new recruits may depend on their colleagues’
willingness to cooperate and share information (see Aghion and Tirole 1997).
5.1.2 Agents of Diﬀerent Cultures
Conﬂicts can also arise between diﬀerent groups of agents within the organization. Consider for
instance a culturally diverse organization in which there is uncertainty about the environment
change (i.e., about ∆0, T or K). Let pA and pB denote the intensity with which agents working
under culture A and B are screened.
23This is a variation on the “club eﬀect”. Ex-ante, applicants to a top Ph.D program wish it were not so
selective. Ex-post, however, those who have been admitted are not only happy that the hurdle was not lower, but
they even want to increase it for future generations (see Result 5 below).
19Result 4 (Conﬂict, 2) Relative to agents working under culture B, agents working under
culture A favor higher values of pA and lower values of pB.
As the screening intensity of agents under culture A increases, the opportunity cost of re-
structuring if C = A0 decreases, which makes such a change more likely (the organization will
adapt for higher K, lower ∆0 and lower T). This in turn makes agents working under culture B
worse-oﬀ. On the other hand, agents under culture A are now better-oﬀ because the organization
will set higher hurdles for restructuring if C = B0. The result then suggests that multi-cultural
organizations may be prone to tensions centered on the control of the hiring policy (see also
Rotemberg and Saloner 1995; Rajan and Zingales 2000).
5.1.3 Agents of Diﬀerent Age
Finally, conﬂicts are also likely to emerge between generations. Older generations of agents have
been screened for longer so, conditional on having survived, their likelihood of being a misﬁt
is lower than that of newer generations. Hence, independently of whether agents know if they
are good ﬁts or not, older agents are relatively less concerned with the possibility of a layoﬀ for
being misﬁts and therefore will favor more intense screening than their younger peers.
Result 5 (Conﬂict, 3) Suppose that the level of screening is chosen by one generation of
agents but applies to all current and future generations. Older agents will favor a more intense
screening than younger ones.
5.2 Expanding Organizations
Concerns about an organization’s culture are often raised at times of expansion, and in particular
during mergers. In our framework, cultural identity can be endangered when the size of an
organization evolves over time.
5.2.1 Growth
Consider an organization growing at rate r, i.e. employing a mass (1 + r)t of agents in period t
(for consistency, we impose the restriction that δ < 1
1+r). Assume that the organization grows
by hiring agents from the labor market. Growth has two limiting eﬀects on the organization’s
commitment ability not to undertake culturally incompatible restructuring. First, old and well
screened agents are “diluted” by the inﬂux of new unscreened agents. Second, faster growing
organizations put a greater weight on future payoﬀs. This increases the attractiveness of adopting
new, more eﬃcient cultures. Both the dilution eﬀect and the long-term concern eﬀect conﬂict
with cultural inertia (see Proposition 1). However, we know that inertia can also be valuable.
Therefore, if growth is a choice variable, the organization will trade-oﬀ the gains from faster
growth against the commitment value of cultural inertia and uniformity.
20Result 6 (Limits to growth) An organization may ﬁnd it optimal to limit its growth rate as
a commitment not to undertake culturally incompatible restructuring. Cultural uniformity will
be more important for faster growing organizations.
Proof. See Appendix A6. 2
The organization might commit not to exploit all its growth opportunities by keeping away
from certain lines of business, or developing a reputation for controlled growth.24 Another
commitment tool is the organization’s degree of cultural uniformity. To sustain fast growth, the
organization may be led to trade-oﬀ cultural diversity against the commitment value of cultural
uniformity. At a more general level, our theory suggests that periods of intense growth are
critical to the organization’s stability. If not carefully managed, growth can destroy cultural
identity and exacerbate incentive problems within the organization. Finally, an aggravating
factor may be the scarcity of suitable agents on the labor market. A growing organization might
be forced to reduce its standards so as to hire enough new agents. This, in turn, reduces the
agents’ incentives to invest in ﬁtting in the organization’s culture.
5.2.2 Mergers
The diﬃculties encountered by some mergers, and even their failure, are sometimes attributed
to “cultural incompatibilities”. Consider two organizations (i ∈ {1,2}) identical in size, age,
etc. merging in period 0. Suppose that both are culturally uniform, with Ci ∈ {A,B} and that
an environment change occurs at date T, with C ∈ {A0,B0} as in our basic model. Does the
merger generate more value when organizations are culturally similar (C1 = C2) or when they
are culturally diﬀerent (C1 6= C2)? If the two organizations are culturally diﬀerent, the merged
organization is such that α = 1/2. Under Assumption 1, this cultural structure is optimal absent
incentive problems. Things are diﬀerent however with more severe incentive problems.
Result 7 (Merger proﬁtability) There exists a threshold ˆ c such that if c ≥ ˆ c then a merger is
more valuable when both organizations have similar rather than diﬀerent cultures (i.e., C1 = C2
rather than C1 6= C2).
From Proposition 5, we know that when incentive problems are severe, organizations are
better-oﬀ with uniform cultures. The same logic naturally extends to the case of mergers. If
two organizations with diﬀerent cultures merge, the new organization is more likely to adapt to
changed environmental conditions. This can be proﬁtable but it may also reduce the incentives
of its agents to undertake culture-speciﬁc investments.
24Building a reputation for controlling growth may be easier that building one for not opportunistically under-
taking culturally incompatible changes. Indeed, the opportunities to show restraint in growth strategy may be
relatively frequent while instances in which a culturally incompatible change is an option are likely to be rare.
215.3 Other applications
In this section, we develop informally some possible extensions of our theory.25
5.3.1 Choosing the Investment Intensity
The agents’ investment decisions involve externalities. For instance, consider a variation of
our model in which the probability of becoming a good ﬁt is monotonically increasing in the
investment incurred. If the agents working under culture A increase their investment level s, the
opportunity cost of a restructuring when C = B0 increases, making such restructuring less likely.
Hence, the choice of a greater s by his peers will make the investment of an agent working under
culture A more secure. This will encourage him also to invest more. This complementarity
between the investment of agents working under the same culture has two implications. First,
there is a multiplier eﬀect of uniformity. Second, multiple equilibria can arise.26
5.3.2 Specialists vs. Generalists
The externality among agents concerns not only the level but also the nature of their invest-
ments. Suppose that agents can either invest in becoming “specialists” (i.e., they maximize
the probability of being good ﬁts for the current culture) or invest in becoming “generalists”
(i.e., less eﬀective in any given culture but more adaptable to other cultures). In terms of our
model, there is a trade-oﬀ between s and µ. The organization’s opportunity cost of undertaking
a culturally incompatible restructuring is lower if its agents are generalists. Hence, an agent’s
incentive to invest in becoming a specialist increases if other agents are specialists whereas his
incentive to become a generalist increases if other agents are also generalists. In other words,
diﬀerences in the nature of investments also give rise to multiple equilibria.
5.3.3 Reputation
One way for the organization to commit not to behave opportunistically is to develop a reputa-
tion for fairness. Kreps (1990) argues that culture, deﬁned as a set of messages stating how the
organization will react to circumstances as they arise, may help in sustaining this reputation.
In this context, reputation remains intact as long as there is an ex-post agreement about which
rule was meant to be applied in each situation, i.e., culture facilitates the evaluation of which
decisions are “fair” (see also Gibbons 1998). But Kreps’ analysis does not explain how repu-
tation is developed in the ﬁrst place. One can argue that reputation is built through time, by
the organization repeatedly refraining from acting opportunistically. According to our model,
25The extensions in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 are treated formally in Carrillo and Gromb (1999).
26Acemoglu (1997) shows a similar multiple equilibria result when human capital and technology are comple-
ments: either workers train and ﬁrms adopt new technologies or they don’t and ﬁrms keep ineﬃcient technologies.
22reputation building is accelerated if, at each period, more agents are in a position to be held up.
As before, uniformity then helps in the commitment not to behave opportunistically.
5.3.4 Core Business
Many organizations are reluctant to undertake ventures outside their core business. Moreover,
even if the organization is diversiﬁed, the dominant culture is usually related to its core business.
There are several explanations for this phenomenon within the context of our framework. First,
the initial culture might have been that of the core business and by inertia the whole organization
was developed around it. Second, agents working in the core business may be less substitutable.
Therefore, insuring them against opportunistic behavior through cultural uniformity is more
important. Last, agents in the core business may be more senior or more key to the organization.
Their greater inﬂuence over the management of the organization’s culture results in a hiring
policy directed to the protection of their own culture-speciﬁc investments.
6 Concluding Remarks
It has been well-established in modern Theory of Organizations that the behavior of individuals
within an organization inﬂuences that of their peers even in the absence of direct externalities.
This in turn shapes the organization’s long run performance, long after these particular agents
have left it. Tirole (1996) proposes as an example of such “group phenomenon” the case of in-
dividuals whose behavior perpetuates the existing reputation (for quality, honesty, etc.) of their
group vis-` a-vis outsiders. This power of inﬂuence may harm the organization’s performance,
as in the case of herd behavior in a career concerns context (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) or
improve it, as in the case of long run cooperation between overlapping generations of agents
(Cr´ emer 1986; Kreps 1990). In this perspective, our contribution is to show that a more homo-
geneous cultural structure provides the organization’s agents with better incentives to undertake
culture-speciﬁc investments, which improves the organization’s performance.
The paper has some interesting empirical implications that one could test. Suppose that
an industry has recently experienced an exogenous contextual change (deregulation, increased
competition from abroad, etc.). Our theory predicts that younger organizations should be more
malleable and therefore succeed better in the new environment than older ones (Proposition 1).
By contrast, ﬁrms with a homogenous culture are likely to suﬀer the most from the contextual
change (Proposition 2). Note however the diﬃculty to evaluate empirically the degree of ho-
mogeneity of an organization. In this respect, it is probably easier to determine whether two
merging organizations have homogeneous cultures or not. The prediction of our theory is that
mergers of ﬁrms with similar cultures will have more problems to adapt to a change (Result 7).
Last, and again under the caveat previously mentioned, industries with culturally homogeneous
23organizations should exhibit greater cultural disparity across organizations (Propositions 2 and
3).
Our analysis has abstracted from factors that might reinforce our results. For instance, cul-
tural uniformity has a further commitment value if the organization can inﬂuence the likelihood
of an environment change. Suppose that the organization can develop alternative personnel
management methods, authority allocation, communication channels, etc. that may result in a
new culture being developed. As the mass of agents working under one culture increases, the
organization will devote more resources to developing alternatives which build on that culture
and less to developing those that would constitute culturally incompatible changes. This re-
sults in such a change being less likely, and hence encourages investments in being a good ﬁt
for the existing culture. Furthermore, our model might under-estimate the beneﬁts of cultural
uniformity by ignoring the possibility that if the organization does not protect its agents against
its own opportunistic behavior, the agents may resort to other, more ineﬃcient entrenchment
methods.
Much work remains to be done. In particular, to focus our discussion, we have left aside
issues such as why and how cultures emerge in the ﬁrst place and what is embodied in the term
culture. Also, our view of cultural structure as part of an incentive scheme begs the question
of how it relates to other incentive tools such as pay-per-performance for example. Last, one
might want to relax some of our model’s assumptions. As pointed by Schein (1986b), culture
is reﬂected in many dimensions: choice of ﬁnancial goals, control system, capital structure,
etc. Hence, the restriction to two cultures may be too simplistic. This raises new interesting
questions. For instance, it might be optimal for a diversiﬁed and well established organization
to focus on a subset of all potential cultures and, at the same time, adopt a balanced allocation
of agents among these cultures. We leave these and other issues for future research.
24Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Given ∂sT
∂T > 0, it is immediate that
∂ Γ−GT·E[γ]
∂ T < 0. As for the discount rate, we have:
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[1 − δλ(1 − ps)]2 ∆E[γ]
which is always positive given ∆0 > ∆.
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
The net eﬀect of an increase in the mass α of agents working under A on the value of restructuring





1 − F(1 − α)

< 0
The argument for the eﬀect of an increase in the mass 1 − α of agents under B on the value of
restructuring when C = A0 is identical.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose ﬁrst that the organization restructures irrespective of whether C = A0 or C = B0. The
optimal cultural mix is then α∗ = argmax
α
1
2 ΠT(α) + 1
2 ΠT(1 − α)
	








T(1 − α) = 0 ⇔
1
2
GT (F(1 − α) − F(α)) = 0













F0(1 − α) + F0(α)

< 0.
Therefore, the maximal payoﬀ conditional on restructuring if C = A0 or C = B0 is ΠT(1
2).
Second, given ∂ΠT(α)/∂α < 0, the optimal cultural mix conditional on restructuring only
if C = B0 is α∗ = 0. Its corresponding expected payoﬀ is 1
2 ΠT(0), and the result follows.
A4. Proof of Proposition 5
First notice that for all parameter values, there is an equilibrium in which no agent invests.
However, we will show that other equilibria always exist and Pareto dominate this one, which
we will thus rule out. The organization can always secure ΠT(0) by setting α ∈ {0,1}. The
question is whether it can do better under cultural diversity. If c ≥ c∗ ≡ W2(1/2,T), then agents
in periods τ = 0,1,...,T − 1 do not invest unless they anticipate no culturally incompatible
restructuring. Therefore, conditional on undertaking only culturally compatible restructuring,
it is optimal for the organization to set all agents under the same culture, α∗ ∈ {0,1}. Q.E.D.
25For completeness, we also analyze the case c < c∗.
• If c is small enough, the incentive constraint is not binding. That is, all agents are willing
to invest to ﬁt into the culture despite the risk of their investment becoming obsolete. In this
case, and given Assumption 1, ﬂexibility is the organization’s optimal strategy. Formally, if
c ≤ W2(1/2,1), then agents hired in period τ = T − 1 invest despite the risk of becoming
redundant at T. Since ∂W2(1/2,t)/∂t > 0, agents in periods T − 2,T − 3,...,0 also invest. In
this case, the incentive constraint is slack and so, by Proposition 3 and Assumption 1, α∗ = 1/2.
• If W2(1/2,1) < c < c∗, then the incentive constraint is slack only for some agents (those
who enter the organization in periods far enough from T). Therefore, only these individuals
are willing to invest despite the possibility of a cultural change. Which strategy –ﬂexibility or
gambling– dominates in this case will crucially depend on how important that fraction of agents
is. Formally, for all α there exist (τ∗
F ∈ (0,T) such that only agents hired before T −τ∗
F invest in
becoming good ﬁts for culture F ∈ {A,B}. In this case, the organization faces two possibilities.
First, to restructure when C = A0 and C = B0 (ﬂexibility). Then, α∗ / ∈ {0,1} (otherwise, either
ΠT(α∗) < 0 or ΠT(1−α∗) < 0). However, α∗ need not be 1/2. Second, to make only culturally
compatible restructuring (gambling), and therefore set α∗ ∈ {0,1}. Note that the organization’s
payoﬀ under ﬂexibility decreases as c increases (technically, for any given α, τ∗
A and τ∗
B are step
functions decreasing in c, which simply means that agents are relatively less willing to invest
the higher the cost). Overall, whether ﬂexibility or gambling is optimal will depend on c. In
particular, for c → c∗ then α∗ ∈ {0,1} and for c → W2(1/2,1) then α∗ = 1/2.
A5. Proof of Result 3
Consider an organization with all agents working under culture A. For a given p, denote by
YN(p) the payoﬀ of an agent when he does not invest and the organization adapts if C = A0 or









1 − δλ(1 − p)







1 − δλ(1 − p)

− c
Other things equal, the agent prefers less screening (∂YI/∂p < 0 and ∂YN/∂p < 0). However,
he also beneﬁts from the organization’s commitment not to adapt if C = B0 (YI(p) > YN(p)).
Now, for any given c, denote by p∗ the probability of detection such that W1(p∗) = c, where
W1(p) is deﬁned by (10).27 Moreover, suppose that Assumption 1 holds for p = p∗.
- If p ∈ [0,p∗), then c > W1(p): the agent does not invest independently of the organization’s
behavior. The organization’s dominant strategy is then to adapt if C = A0 or C = B0. The
agents’ payoﬀ is YN(p), which is maximized at p = 0.
27Note that W1(0) = 0, so for all c > 0 we have p
∗ > 0. Besides, dp
∗/dc > 0.
26- If p ∈ [p∗,1], then c ≤ W1(p): the agent invests if the organization undertakes only
culturally compatible restructuring. Given Assumption 1, the organization’s dominant strategy
is then to adapt only if C = A0. The agents’ payoﬀ is YI(p), which is maximized at p = p∗.
Overall, agents optimally choose p = p∗ if YI(p∗) > YN(0) and p = 0 if YI(p∗) < YN(0).28
A6. Proof of Result 6
Suppose that C = B0 and conduct the following thought experiment. Suppose that the organi-
zation stops growing after period T. In period t ∈ {1,...,T}, the mass of agents is (1+r)t and










For all t, the cultural ﬁt ˆ st decreases with r (i.e. ∂ˆ st/∂r < 0): ˆ st is a weighted average of sτ with
τ ∈ {0,...,t}, and it is easily checked that the relative weight on larger values of τ decreases as













where ˆ GT is deﬁned as GT in equation (7) replacing sT with ˆ sT. Consider now the eﬀect of
growth after period T. In period T+τ, a mass r(1+r)T+τ−1 of new agents are hired, an expected




δτr(1 + r)T+τ−1 ∆0 · E[γ].
Summing these terms, the organization’s net expected gain from adapting is:















δτr(1 + r)T+τ−1 ∆0 · E[γ] − K.
That is, the organization adapts when C = B0 if and only if ˆ Π > 0. Given that ∂ˆ sT/∂r < 0,
it is easily shown that ∂ˆ Π/∂r > 0. By Assumption 1, we have that ˆ Π(α = 1,r = 0,T) < 0.
Besides, if r → (1 − δ)/δ (i.e., if 1/(1 + r) → δ), then ˆ Π → +∞. Hence, by continuity, there
exists a unique rmax(α,T) such that ˆ Π(α,rmax(α,T),T) = 0. Note that since ∂ˆ Π/∂α < 0 we
have ∂rmax/∂α > 0 and rmax is maximal for α = 1.
28In this model, the agents’ optimal screening intensity is either 0 or p
∗. This can be easily generalized. For
instance, if the date of the environment change is uncertain, agents will choose (depending on ΠT) among several
locally optimal positive levels of screening.
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